While the crisis of statistics has made it to the headlines, that of mathematical modelling hasn't. Something can be learned comparing the two, and looking at other instances of production of numbers.Sociology of quantification and postnormal science can help.
of Fig. 1 can be seen in many fields of modelling and data analysis, and if the recommendations of the present comment should be limited to one, it would be that a poster of Fig. 1 hangs in every office where modelling takes place.
In modelling-as is the case of statistics, one can expect a mix of technical and normative problems-the latter referring to expectations, interests, values and policies being touched by the modelling activity. In cost-benefit analyses an estimate of return giving a range from a large loss to a large gain may not be what the client wishes to hear. The analysts may be tempted to "adjust" the uncertainty in the input until the output range is narrower and conveniently located in friendlier territory. Integrated climate-economy models pretend to show the fate of the planet and its economy several decades ahead, while uncertainty is so wide as to render any expectations for the future meaningless. In economics, models universally known to be wrong continue to play a role in economic policy decisions, while the neologism 'mathiness' has been proposed for the use of mathematics in models to veil ideological stances. Disingenuous pricing of opaque financial products is held as partly responsible for the onset of the last recession: modellers chose to calibrate the pricing of bundles of mortgages based on data for the real estate market in an up-swing period. Needless to say, these calibrations conveniently ignored what would happen when the market took a turn for the worse. Transport policy offer a curious example where a model requires as an input how many people will be sitting in a car on average decades from now. See ref. 1 for the references to the cases just described. More examples are described in ref. 6 , portraying flawed models used to justify unwise policies in evaluation of fisheries' stock, AIDS epidemics, mill tailing, coastal erosion, and so on. Among those, studies for the safety of an underground disposal of radioactive waste stand out for providing what the authors in 6 call "A million years of certainty", achieved thanks to a huge mathematical model including 286 sub-models.
Modelling hubris may lead to "trans-science", a practice which lends itself to the language and formalism of science but where science cannot provide answers 7 . Models may be used as a convenient tool of displacement -from what happens in reality to what happens in the model 8 . The merging of algorithms with big data blurs many existing distinctions among different instances of quantification, leading to the question "what qualities are specific to rankings, or indicators, or models, or algorithms?" 9 Thus the problems just highlighted are likely to apply to all of these instances, as shown by the recent alarm about unethical use of algorithms 10 , the disruptive use of artificial intelligence exemplified by Facebook, or the well documented problems with the abuse of metrics 11 , which is now reflected in an increasing militancy against statistical and metrical abuses 12 .
This is not an indictment of mathematical modelling. Modelling is essential to the scientific enterprise. When Steven Shapin, a scholar studying science and technology, talks about "invisible science"-meaning scientific and technological products which improve our life-one chapter could be devoted to "invisible models" underpinning these technologies. The malpractices alluded to above are all different: not only a racist algorithm is different from an audacious cost-benefit analysis, or a low-powered statistical study. Even within modelling, different problems are at play. Modelling hubris has its counterpart in living in an idealised model-land of appealing simplicity but scarce realism 6 .
Hence, recipes cannot be prescriptive or universal. The following could help (see ref. 1 
for details):
• Memento Fig. 1 .
• Mathematical modelling could benefit from structure and standards based on statistical principles including a systemic appraisal of model uncertainties and parametric sensitivities.
• Statistics could help by internalising these into its own syllabi and practices.
• Models-including algorithms, should be made inherently interpretable.
• For key models used in policy, peer review should be extended to include auditing by an extended community involving a plurality of disciplines and interested actors, leading to model pedigrees, as discussed on this journal 3 and more diffusely in ref. 1 .
• Audits could be used to uncover a model's underlying, unspoken, metaphors 1 .
To put the prescriptions into practice a movement of resistance is needed, perhaps along the lines of the so-called statistical activism 12 . This kind of resistance is familiar to scholars gathered around post-normal science (PNS) 13 . The foundational works 14, 15 of PNS' fathers Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz see model quality in terms of fitness for purpose. As noted in ref. 3 this view-with would entail reconsidering the model any time to see whether the purpose or the question put to the model are changed-is still a minority view in the modelling community. PNS suggests an approach to the use of models which is more reflexive-i.e., the analyst is part of the analysis, and participatory-including an extended peer community. While this vision is gaining new traction 3 more could be done. A new ethics of quantification (https://www.uib.no/en/svt/127044/ethicsquantification) must be nurtured, which takes inspiration from a long tradition of sociology of numbers; Pierre Bourdieu 12 and Theodor Porter 16 come to mind. What the authors in ref. 3 chose to call the distinction between a positivistic and a relativistic philosophy in model validation needs to be overcome for progress to be achieved. (ii) error propagation, which results from the uncertainty in the input variables propagating to the model output. This term grows with model complexity. Whenever the system being modelled in not elementary, overlooking important processes leaves us on the left-hand side of the plot, while modelling hubris can take us to the right-hand side
